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Abstract: The paper develops a four-sector general equilibrium model where the fair wage 
hypothesis is valid and there is agricultural dualism for analyzing the consequence of an inflow of 
foreign capital on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality and the unemployment of skilled labour 
in a developing economy. The unskilled workers are fully employed but there is imperfection in 
the market for unskilled labour. On the contrary, the skilled wage is set by the firms by 
minimizing the unit cost of skilled labour and their efficiency depends on the relative income 
distribution and the unemployment rate. The analysis finds that an inflow of foreign capital 
worsens the relative wage inequality but lowers the unemployment of skilled labour. It provides 
an alternative theoretical foundation to the empirical finding that inflows of foreign capital might 
have produced unfavourable effect on the wage inequality in the developing countries during the 
liberalized regime by increasing the relative demand for skilled labour.  
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Fair Wage Hypothesis, Foreign Capital Inflow and Skilled-unskilled Wage 
Inequality in the Presence of Agricultural Dualism 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The deteriorating skilled-unskilled wage inequality is a matter of deep concern in the developing 
nations during the liberalized regime although as per the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson theorem it 
should have improved owing to economic liberalization. The theoretical literature explaining the 
deteriorating wage inequality in the developing countries includes works of Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996), Marjit and Acharya (2003), Marjit and Kar (2005), Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri (2007), 
Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarti (2004) and Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007). They have shown 
how trade liberalization, international migration of labour and inflows of foreign capital might 
produce unfavourable effects on the wage inequality in the South given the specific structural 
characteristics of the less developed countries, such as features of labour markets, structures of 
production, nature of capital mobility etc.  
 
As per the empirical literature, growth in foreign direct investment which is positively correlated 
with the relative demand for skilled labour has been one of the prime factors1 responsible for the 
growing incidence of wage inequality in the South. The paper of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) is 
based on the famous Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson continuum-of-goods framework. According 
to them, inflows of foreign capital induced greater production of skilled-intensive commodities in 
Mexico, thereby leading to a relative decrease in the demand for unskilled labour. Marjit, Beladi 
and Chakrabarti (2004) have analyzed how diverse trade pattern and market fragmentation in 
world trade can adversely affect the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the developing countries. 
They have also studied the consequences of an improvement of terms of trade and inflows of 
foreign capital on wage inequality with or without trade fragmentation. Their paper shows that 
without trade fragmentation improvements in terms of trade and/or inflows of foreign capital may 
worsen wage inequality if the vertically integrated skilled export sector is more capital-intensive 
vis-à-vis the import-competing sector. But, with trade fragmentation the consequences on the 
                                                 
1 See Harrison and Hanson (1999), Hanson and Harrison (1999), Curie and Harrison (1997), and 
Beyer, Rojas and Vergara (1999) in this context. 
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relative wage inequality might be different.2 However, all these papers have considered full-
employment framework and hence have ignored the problem of unemployment which is a salient 
feature of these economies. But how to explain unemployment as a general equilibrium 
phenomenon depends on which type of labour we are considering. Harris-Todaro (1970) type of 
model is one way to explain unemployment in a general equilibrium setup where the efficiency of 
each worker is considered to be exogenously given and equal to unity. However, in such a model 
unemployment is specific to the urban sector only and is suitable to explain unemployment of 
unskilled labour only. There is a paper in the literature by Beladi, Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi 
(2008) that has used a 2×3 Harris-Todaro setup to examine the consequences of international 
mobility of different factors of production on the relative wage inequality. But it does not account 
for the unemployment of skilled labour which is a disquieting problem in a developing economy 
where skilled labour is scarce. Apart from this none of above works takes into consideration 
agricultural dualism which is another important feature of the developing economies. 
 
Agricultural dualism is a common symptom of the developing countries. The distinction between 
advanced and backward agriculture can be made on the basis of inputs used, economies of scale, 
efficiency and elasticity of substitution. Many of the farmers in the agricultural sector of a 
developing economy stick to old and unscientific methods of cultivation although in other parts of 
the economy the introduction of the so called ‘Green Revolution’ technology brought about 
revolutionary changes with respect to production technologies and modern inputs use and the 
increase in factor productivity. However, the improved technology was designed for the best 
areas (irrigation, high soil fertility) with chemical intensive technology. Although, Green 
Revolution has modernized agricultural technology, it is limited only to a few parts of a 
developing economy and only rich (large) farmers have been benefited from it. The small and 
marginal farmers continue to depend on rain-fed backward agricultural technique. Therefore, the 
adoption of the Green Revolution technology has led to an increase in the extent of agricultural 
dualism in a developing economy.   
 
The present paper seeks to examine the consequence of an inflow of foreign capital on the 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the presence of agricultural dualism and when there exists 
                                                 
2 An inflow of foreign capital may worsen the wage inequality even with trade fragmentation if 
the traded intermediate good sector is capital-intensive relative to the import-competing sector. 
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unemployment of skilled labour which is explained by the ‘fair wage hypothesis’ (FWH).3 
Following Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995) treatment of the FWH, we assume that the efficiency 
of a skilled worker is sensitive to the functional distribution of income. Consequently, the return 
to capital and the wage rates of different types of labour appear as arguments in the efficiency 
function. We consider a four-sector general equilibrium framework for the purpose of analysis 
where there are two agricultural sectors, one low-skill manufacturing sector and one high-skill 
sector. The agricultural sectors use unskilled labour and land-capital as the two inputs. Sector 1 is 
the advanced agricultural sector while sector 2 is the backward agricultural sector. The input 
‘land-capital’ is broadly conceived to include durable capital equipments of all kinds.4 It is 
sensible to assume that sector 1 (sector 2) is more land-capital-intensive (unskilled labour-
intensive) than sector 2 (sector 1). Sector 3 produces a low-skill manufacturing commodity using 
unskilled labour and capital. On the other hand, sector 4 produces a high-skill commodity with 
the help of skilled labour and capital. Wages are set according to the FWH in high-skill sector 
while in the other three sectors where unskilled labour is used competitive forces or trade union 
activities determine the wages. Unskilled workers in the low-skill manufacturing sector are 
organized and through collective bargaining they can ensure a higher unionized wage, *W , than 
what their counterparts earn in the two agricultural sectors, W . Using such a framework we show 
that an inflow of foreign capital in the two manufacturing sectors worsens the skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality and lowers the unemployment of skilled labour. Thus this paper provides an 
alternative theoretical foundation to the empirical finding that foreign capital inflows might have 
produced an adverse effect on the relative wage inequality in the liberalized regime.                      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The existence of unemployment of skilled labour can be explained using the efficiency wage 
theories. One version of efficiency wage theory is based upon the work of Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984) where the work-effort of a worker is positively related to both the wage rate and 
unemployment rate. However, it should be kept in mind that the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) type 
of unemployment is relevant only where there is ‘hire and fire’ recruitment policy of labour. A 
more generalized version of efficiency wage theory is the ‘fair wage hypothesis’ (FWH). Agell 
and Lundborg (1992, 1995), Feher (1991), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), etc. have explained 
unemployment as a general equilibrium phenomenon using the FWH. 
 
4 See Bardhan (1972) and Chaudhuri (2007) in this context. 
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2. The model 
 
We consider a four-sector economy where all the sectors operate at close vicinity. There are two 
types of labour: unskilled and skilled. Sector 1 is the advanced agricultural sector that uses 
unskilled labour and land-capital as inputs. Sector 2 is the backward agricultural sector which 
also uses the same two inputs. Sector 1 (sector 2) uses land-capital (unskilled labour) more 
intensively than sector 2 (sector 1). These two are the unorganized sectors where unskilled 
workers receive a competitive wage,W . Sector 3 produces a low-skill manufacturing commodity 
with the help of unskilled labour and capital. Unskilled workers in this sector are organized. They 
successfully bargain with their employers to secure a higher unionized wage, *W , than their 
counterparts in the other two sectors. Sector 4 produces a high-skill commodity using skilled 
labour and capital. So capital is perfectly mobile between sectors 3 and 4 while land-caoital is 
perfectly mobile between the first two sectors of the economy. Skilled labour is specific to sector 
4 while unskilled labour is imperfectly mobile between the first three sectors although it is 
perfectly mobile between sector 1 and sector 2. The efficiency of each unskilled worker is 
assumed to be exogenously given and equal to unity. We assume that the fair wage hypothesis 
(FWH) is valid and is applicable to skilled workers only. This gives rise to unemployment of 
skilled labour. On the contrary, there is no unemployment of unskilled labour.5 The unskilled 
workers first try to get employment in the higher paid manufacturing sector (sector 3) and those 
who are unable to get employment in that sector are automatically absorbed in the other two 
sectors where the wage rate is completely flexible. All the commodities are internationally traded 
and hence their prices are given internationally. The production functions exhibit constant returns 
to scale with positive but diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. All markets excepting 
the unskilled labour market in sector 3 and the skilled labour market are perfectly competitive. 
The capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic capital and foreign capital which are 
perfect substitutes. Finally, commodity 2 is chosen as the numeraire. 
 
The following symbols will be used for formal presentation of the model. 
                                                 
5 In reality, there exists open unemployment of unskilled labour which can be explained either by 
the Harris-Todaro (1970) migration theory or by the ‘consumption efficiency hypothesis’ of 
Leibenstein (1957) and Bliss and Stern (1978). As we like to emphasize on the FWH and the 
resultant skilled unemployment we ignore unemployment of unskilled labour. However, the basic 
results of the paper remain unaltered even if one accommodates unskilled unemployment 
following either of the two above-mentioned ways. 
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Nia =  land-capital-output ratio in the ith sector, i =  1,2,;   
Kia =  capital-output ratio in the ith sector, i =  3, 4; 
=Lia unskilled labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i =  1,2,3; 
4Sa = skilled labour-output ratio in sector 4 (in efficiency unit); 
=iP exogenously given relative price of the i th commodity, i  = 1,3,4; 
=iX level of output of the i th sector, i =  1,2,3,4; 
E = efficiency of each skilled worker; 
=SW wage rate of skilled labour; 
SW
E
=wage rate per efficiency unit of skilled labour; 
=*W  unionized unskilled wage in sector 3; 
=W competitive wage rate of unskilled labour in sectors 1 and 2; 
AW = the average unskilled wage; 
R = return to land-capital; 
=r  return to capital (both domestic and foreign); 
=L  endowment of unskilled labour; 
v = unemployment rate of skilled labour; 
=S  endowment of skilled labour (in physical unit); 
U = unemployment of skilled labour (in physical unit); 
N = given endowment of land-capital; 
=K  aggregate capital stock of the economy (domestic plus foreign); 
=jiθ distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector for =j , , ,L S N K  and =i  1, 2, 3, 4; 
=jiλ proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector for =j , ,L N K and =i 1,2,3, 4; 
=∧'' proportionate change. 
 
Given the perfectly competitive commodity markets the three price-unit cost equality conditions 
relating to the four industries are as follows. 
1 1 1L NWa Ra P+ =                                       (1)   
2 2 1L NWa Ra+ =          (2) 
 * 3 3 3L KW a ra P+ =                                (3)  
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4 4 4
S
S K
W a ra P
E
+ =          (4) 
 
As the unskilled workers in this model earn two different wage rates in the different sectors the 
average unskilled wage is given by6 
 *1 2 3 3( ) * ( )A L L L LW W W W W Wλ λ λ λ≡ + + ≡ + −                         (5)  
  
Following Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995) we assume the efficiency of each skilled worker to 
be positively related to the skilled wage relative to the average unskilled wage, skilled wage 
relative to the return to land-capital, skilled wage relative to capital and the skilled unemployment 
rate.7 Thus we have 
( , , , );S S S
A
W W WE E v
W R r
=  
with 1 2 3 4 11 22 33, , , 0; , , 0;E E E E E E E> < 13 12 14 23 24 0E E E E E= = = = = ⁮8                   (6) 
 
The unit cost of skilled labour,ϖ , is given by 
( )
(.)
SW
E
ϖ =           (7) 
 
Apart from skilled labour, capital is used in production in sector 3. Assuming capital to be 
perfectly mobile intersectorally and its uniform return be r economy-wide, each firm in sector 3 
minimizes its unit cost of skilled labour as given by (7). The first-order condition of minimization 
is 
1 2 3
S S S
A
W W WE E E E
W R r
= + + +         (8) 
                                                 
6 Note that 3 1 21 ( ).L L Lλ λ λ= − +  
 
7 The micro foundation of such an efficiency function is available in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 
1995).  
 
8 The cross-effects have been assumed to zero which is a simplifying assumption. However, 
Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995) in some cases have also made this assumption.   
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where: 1 ( ) 0
S
A
EE W
W
∂= >
∂
; 2 ( ) 0
S
EE W
R
∂= >
∂
; and, 3 ( ) 0
S
EE W
r
∂= >
∂
are the partial derivatives of 
the efficiency function with respect to ( )S
A
W
W
, ( )SW
R
and ( )SW
r
, respectively.  
 
Full-employment conditions for unskilled labour, land-capital and capital are given by the 
following three equations, respectively. 
1 1 2 2 3 3L L La X a X a X L+ + =           (9) 
1 1 2 2N Na X a X N+ =          (10) 
  3 3 4 4K Ka X a X K+ =             (11) 
  
Sectors 1 and 2 use the same two inputs: unskilled labour and land-capital and hence can be 
classified in terms factor intensities. It is natural to assume that sector 1 (sector 2) is more land-
capital (unskilled labour) intensive than sector 2 (sector 1). 
 
There is unemployment of skilled labour in the economy and the rate of unemployment is .v  The 
skilled labour endowment equation is, therefore, given by 
4 4 (1 )Sa X E v S= −            (12) 
The general framework consists of equations (1) – (4), (6) and (8) – (12). There are ten 
independent equations and the same number of endogenous variables; namely, , , ,W R r ,SW  
1 2, , ,E v X X , 3X and 4X . 
 
Using (12), equation (11) can be rewritten as 
4
3 3
4
( ) (1 )KK
S
aa X E v S K
a
+ − =                                                             (11.1) 
The two agricultural sectors; namely, sectors 1 and 2 together form a Heckscher-Ohlin-subsystem 
(HOSS) as they use the same two inputs. W and R are determined from equations (1) and (2). 
Given *W , r is determined from equation (3). The equilibrium values of 1, , ,SW E v X , 2X and 
3X are obtained by solving equations (4), (6), (8) – (10) and (11.1). Finally, plugging the values 
of , ,SW r E and v  into (12), 4X is found.  
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Unskilled workers in this system earn two different wages − either the unionized wage, *W , in 
sector 3 or a lower competitive wage,W , in sector 1 and sector 2. The average wage for unskilled 
labour is given by equation (5). The skilled−unskilled wage gap in the present case improves 
(worsens) in absolute terms if the gap between SW  and AW  falls (rises). On the other hand, the 
wage inequality improves (deteriorates) both in absolute and relative terms if .0)()ˆˆ( ><− AS WW  
 
3. Comparative Statics    
 
In this section of the paper we will examine the consequence of an inflow of foreign capital and 
on the relative wage inequality. The effect of liberalized investment policy on the skilled 
unemployment will also be analyzed.  
 
As r is obtained from equation (3), it follows from (4) that ( )SW
E
is constant. So the skilled wage 
and the efficiency of skilled labour must move in the same direction and in the same proportion. 
 
Differentiating equations (4) and (5) we get, respectively 
ˆ ˆ
SW E=           (13) 
*
3
3
( )ˆ ˆL
A
A
W WW X
W
λ −=                                                  (14)   
 
Totally differentiating equation (6) one gets 
1 2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )S A S SE W W W W vε ε ε ε= − + + +        (15) 
where 1 2 3, ,ε ε ε and 4 0ε > are the elasticities of (.)E with respect to , ,S S S
A
W W W
W R r
and v , 
respectively.  
 
Dividing both sides of (8) by E one obtains 
1 2 31 ε ε ε= + +           (16) 
This is the famous modified Solow condition as obtained in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995). 
Substituting 2 3 1( ) (1 )ε ε ε+ = − into (15), using (13) and simplifying we find 
1 4
ˆ ˆAW vε ε=           (17) 
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Equation (17) implies that the average unskilled wage, AW , and the unemployment rate of skilled 
labour, v , are positively related. This establishes the following corollary. 
Corollary 1: The average unskilled wage, AW , and the rate of skilled unemployment, v , are 
proportionately related.   
 
Totally differentiating equations (6), (8), (9), (10) and (11.1), using (13) and (14) and solving by 
Cramer’s rule the following results can be derived, 
When ˆ 0N > , 1ˆ 0X > ; 2ˆ 0X <  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤ ; 3 4ˆ ˆ, 0X X = and,   (18.1) 
when ˆ 0,K > 1ˆ 0X < ; and, 2ˆ 0X > ; 3ˆ 0X < ; and, 4ˆ 0X >  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤   (18.2)            
where: 41 ( ) 0;1
K vA
v
λ= >− and,
3
2
( * )( ) 0.L
A
W WA
W
λ −= >      (18.3)  
    
As mentioned earlier sectors 1 and 2 together form a HOSS displaying Heckscher-Ohlin 
properties and sector 1 is land-capital-intensive while sector 2 is unskilled labour-intensive with 
respect to the other factor of production. So if the endowment of land-capital, N , rises sector 1 
must expand while sector 2 should contract following the Rybczynski effect. Our analysis 
suggests that the output levels in the HOSS respond normally (i.e. as per the relative factor 
intensities) to changes in factor endowments under the sufficient condition that 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤ . 
We assume that this condition holds. We should note that any changes in the endowment of land-
capital cannot affect the output levels of sectors 3 and 4.  
 
Our analysis also suggests that sectors 1 and 3 contract while sectors 2 and 4 expand following an 
increase in the capital endowment of the economy under the sufficient condition 
that 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤ .   
 
Again differentiating equations (6), (8), (9), (10) and (11.1), using (13) and (14) and solving the 
following expressions are obtained. 
1 2 2 1 1 2 4 4
ˆˆ ( )[( ) ]( )S N L N L
KW A E Aλ λ λ λ ε ε= − + ∆       (19) 
1 2 2 1 4
2 3
( )ˆ ˆN L N L
AW A A K
λ λ λ λ ε−= ∆        (20) 
and, 
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1 2 2 1 1
2 3
( ) ˆˆ 0N L N Lv A A Kλ λ λ λ ε−= <∆        (21)     
where: 2 2 23 11 22 33[( ) ( ) ( ) ] 0S S S
A
W W WA E E E
W R r
= + + < ; and, 
2 3
4 11
( * )[( ) ] 0.S L
A A
W W WA E
W W
λ −= <        (22) 
1 2 2 1 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 4 4( )[( ) ( ) ]N L N L K KA A A A E Aλ λ λ λ λ ε ε λ ε ε∆ = − − + +  
 
Using (18.3) and (22) it can be shown that9 
0∆ > if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤         (23) 
 
Subtracting (20) from (19) the following result can be easily derived.10 
ˆ ˆ( ) 0ˆ
S AW W
K
− <  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤                  (24) 
  
From (21) the following proposition follows immediately. 
Proposition 1: The skilled-unskilled wage inequality deteriorates following an inflow of foreign 
capital if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤ .  
 
Proposition 1 can intuitively be explained as follows. We note that , ,W R r and ( )SW
E
are 
determined from the price system11 consisting of equations (1) – (4) and hence are independent 
of factor endowments. An inflow of foreign capital leads to a contraction of sector 3 and an 
                                                 
9 This is shown in Appendix I. 
 
10 This has been derived in Appendix II. 
 
11 The skilled wage per efficiency unit, S
W
E
, is determined from equation (4) once r is obtained 
from (3). However, the individual determination of SW and E requires the use of equations of the 
output system. Thus, these variables depend on factor endowments although their ratio does not.  
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expansion of sector 4.12 The demand for skilled labour rises in sector 4 that raises the skilled 
wage. On the other hand, a contraction of sector 3 releases unskilled labour which in turn 
increases the availability of unskilled labour in the HOSS. This produces a Rybczynski type 
effect leading to an expansion of sector 2 and a contraction of sector 1 as sector 2 is unskilled 
labour-intensive. As the higher unskilled wage-paying sector (sector 3) contracts both in terms of 
output and employment the aggregate unskilled wage income and hence the average unskilled 
wage must fall. Consequently, the skilled-unskilled wage inequality worsens. 
 
Now let us examine the consequence of the liberalized investment policy on the unemployment of 
skilled labour, denoted, ,U and is given by 
U vS=           (25) 
 
Differentiating (25) and using (18) and (21) the following result can be obtained. 
1 2 2 1 1
2 3
ˆ ˆ ( )( ) 0ˆ ˆ
N L N LU v A A
K K
λ λ λ λ ε−= = <∆       (26) 
                       
Hence the following proposition can now be established. 
Proposition 2: An inflow of foreign capital lowers the level of skilled unemployment if 
3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤  
 
From corollary 1 we have seen that the average unskilled wage, AW , and the skilled 
unemployment rate, v , are positively related. As sector 2 expands and sector 3 contracts 
following an inflow of foreign capital, AW , falls which in turn raises, v . The aggregate skilled 
unemployment, ,vS rises as S has not changed. 
   
4.  Concluding remarks 
 
The paper has developed a four-sector general equilibrium model where the fair wage hypothesis 
(FWH) is valid and there is agricultural dualism so as to analyze the effects of inflows of foreign 
capital on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality and the unemployment of skilled labour. There 
are two types of labour in the model: unskilled and skilled. The unskilled workers are fully 
                                                 
12 These results have been proved in Appendix I. 
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employed but there is imperfection in the unskilled labour market. On the contrary, the skilled 
wage is set by the firms by minimizing the unit cost of skilled labour and their efficiency depends 
on the relative income distribution and the unemployment rate. Besides, there is agricultural 
dualism where advanced agriculture and backward agriculture coexist and these sectors together 
form a Heckscher-Ohlin-subsystem. This theoretical analysis deserves special attention because 
no attempt has earlier been made to use the efficiency wage theory, especially the FWH version 
of the theory, for analyzing the consequences of liberalized economic policies on the skilled-
unskilled wage inequality in a developing economy. This exercise has found that an inflow of 
foreign capital worsens the relative wage inequality and lowers the unemployment of skilled 
labour. Thus the paper provides an alternative theoretical foundation to the empirical finding that 
inflows of foreign capital might have produced unfavourable effect on the wage inequality in the 
developing countries by increasing the relative demand for skilled labour.  
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Appendix I: 
 
Differentiating (9), (10), (11.1), (6) and (8) and using (13), (14) and the modified-Solow 
condition as given by (16) we obtain, respectively 
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
N NX X Nλ λ+ =                               (A.1)   
1 1 2 2 3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0L L LX X Xλ λ λ+ + =                                                                          `    (A.2)              
3 3 3 1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆK K SX W A v Kλ λ+ − =                                      (A.3) 
1 2 3 4
ˆ ˆ 0A X vε ε− =                       (A.4) 
3 4 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0SA W A X E vε− − =            (A.5) 
 
where:  
4
1 ( ) 0;1
K vA
v
λ= >−
3
2
( * )( ) 0;L
A
W WA
W
λ −= >  
2 2 2
3 11 22 33[( ) ( ) ( ) ] 0S S S
A
W W WA E E E
W R r
= + + < ; and,                     (A.6) 
2 3
4 11
( * )[( ) ] 0.S L
A A
W W WA E
W W
λ −= <  
 
Writing equations (A.1) – (A.5) in a matrix notation one gets 
1
1 2
21 2 3
3 4 1 3
1 2 4
4 3 4
ˆ ˆ    0    0      0
ˆ 0       0      0
ˆ ˆ0     0        -A
ˆ 00     0    A   0    -
00     0     -A   A   -E ˆ
N N
L L L
K K
S
X N
X
X K
W
v
λ λ
λ λ λ
λ λ
ε ε
ε
                    =                     
                               (A.7) 
Here the determinant of the coefficient matrix is 
:  
1 2 2 1 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 4 4( )[( ) ( ) ]N L N L K KA A A A E Aλ λ λ λ λ ε ε λ ε ε∆ = − − + +    (A.8) 
3
1 2 4 1 11 1 112
( * )( ) [{ }{ ( ) }] 0 (as E >0; and, E <0)
( )
L S S
A A
W W W WA E A E E
W W
λε −+ = + >  (A.9) 
Using (A.9) from (A.8) it follows that 
 16 
0∆ > if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤    (23) 
[Note that 1 2 2 1( ) 0N L N Lλ λ λ λ− >  as sector 1 is land-capital-intensive relative to sector 2.] 
 
Solving (A.7) by Cramer’s rule we can derive the following expressions. 
2 3 3 42
1 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 4
ˆˆ ˆ( )[( ) ( )] ( )N LL K K
ANX A A A A E A Kλ λ ελ λ ε ε λ ε ε= − + + +∆ ∆   (A.10) 
1 3 3 41
2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 4
ˆˆ ˆ( )[( ) ( )] ( )N LL K K
ANX A A A A E A Kλ λ ελ λ ε ε λ ε ε= − − + + −∆ ∆   (A.11) 
1 2 2 1 3 4
3
)ˆ ˆ( )N L N L AX Kλ λ λ λ ε−= ∆        (A.12) 
Using (18.3), (22) and (A.9) from (A.10) and (A.11) one can find that 
When ˆ 0N > , 1ˆ 0X > ; 2ˆ 0X < ;and, 3ˆ 0X =  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤ ;    (18.1) 
When ˆ 0,K > 1ˆ 0X < ; and, 2ˆ 0X > ;and, 3ˆ 0X <  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤    (18.2)             
 
Again, differentiating (12) and using (13) one obtains 
4
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
1S
vX W v
v
= − −          (A.13) 
Using (19) and (21) from (A.13) one gets 
1 2 3
4 1 2 1 1 1 2 4 4
ˆˆ ( )[( ) ]( )
1N L N L
v A A KX A E A
v
ελ λ λ λ ε ε= − + − − ∆     (A.14) 
Using (A.9) and (23) from (A.14) it follows that 
4
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
X
K
>  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤         (A.15) 
 
Appendix II:      
 
Solving (A.7) we can also derive the following expressions. 
1 2 2 1
1 2 4 4
ˆ ˆ( )[( ) ]N L N LSW A E A K
λ λ λ λ ε ε−= +∆       (19) 
1 2 2 1
1 2 3
ˆˆ [( )( )]N L N Lv A A Kλ λ λ λ ε−= ∆        (21) 
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Again using (A.12) from (14) one can derive 
1 2 2 1 4
2 3
( )ˆ ˆN L N L
AW A A K
λ λ λ λ ε−= ∆        (20) 
 
Subtracting (20) from (19) we find 
1 2 2 1
4 1 2 4 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) [( ) ]N L N LS AW W A E A A A K
λ λ λ λ ε ε−− = + −∆     (A.16) 
Using (18.3), (22) and (A.9) from (A.16) one finds that 
ˆ ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
S AW W
K
− >  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤ . 
 
Skilled unemployment is,  
U vS=           (25) 
 
Differentiating (25) one gets 
ˆˆ ˆU v S= +           (A.17) 
Putting ˆ 0S = and using (18) the following result can be obtained. 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
U v
K K
=      
Using (21) we get 
1 2 2 1 1
2 3
ˆ ˆ ( )( )ˆ ˆ
N L N LU v A A
K K
λ λ λ λ ε−= = ∆        (26) 
From (26) it follows that 
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
U
K
<  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤  
[Note that 1 2 2 1( ) 0N L N Lλ λ λ λ− > ; 1,ε 2 30; 0;A A> < and, 0∆ >  if 3 4 1 1 2K A Aλ ε ε≤ .]   
So, the unemployment of skilled labour decreases following an inflow of foreign capital.                                   
